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Summary
The querulous nature of transboundary water governance is as old as the concept and practice of transboundary 
water management. Its discourse is now overwhelmed by attempts made and lessons learnt in transboundary 
water management. Against this background, this paper presents a systematic inquiry into the rationale behind 
transboundary cooperation in order to reinforce and inform further research on and practice of transboundary water 
governance in the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region. Why should riparian countries collaborate with each other 
to form a transboundary alliance? This narrative review attempts to provide a justification for a pragmatic approach 
to transboundary water governance that goes beyond the dialectics of conflict and cooperation, particularly for 
countries in the HKH, where research evidence suggests that such a governance system could have momentous 
socio-economic as well as political implications. Research dedicated to finding this rationale is restricted to 
secondary-data analysis based mainly on national and international level research-based perspectives on the need 
for transboundary water management. The main objective of the review is to aid the understanding of the current 




The querulous nature of transboundary water governance is as old as the concept and practice of transboundary 
water management. Its discourse is now overwhelmed by attempts made and lessons learnt in transboundary water 
management. At the core of the rationale lies the question why countries should collaborate with each other to 
engage in transboundary alliances. Against this background, this narrative review presents a systematic inquiry 
into the rationale behind transboundary cooperation in order to reinforce and inform further research on and 
practice of transboundary water governance in the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region. It provides a justification 
for a pragmatic approach to transboundary water governance that goes beyond the dialectics of conflict and 
cooperation, particularly for countries in the HKH, where research evidence suggests that such a governance system 
could have momentous socio-economic as well as political implications. 
There are two broadly framed justifications for countries to engage in transboundary management of water 
resources. The first is the realisation that interdependencies in the upstream and downstream areas in a river basin 
cannot be neglected, as conflicts may arise due to such indifference. The second is the recognition that countries 
are bound to enjoy better policies and management practices in water and other sectors through collaboration. The 
inclusion and participation of all riparian countries becomes dire in order to ensure that all riparian countries have 
the opportunity to tap into whatever benefit the river-basin may provide as a whole. Transboundary water alliances 
may not just be a necessity for some countries linked inextricably by their riparian interdependencies. They could 
also become an opportunity to manage water resources, especially to enjoy benefits incurred by such an alliance in 
non-water sectors. Water has increasingly been linked to energy, agriculture, and food security in the HKH region. 
Indeed, hydropower and irrigation are the two most significant uses of water that have long been regulated through 
international treaties, and this trend of water use seems to be echoed in riparian HKH countries
Skepticism regarding net benefits coming through transboundary alliances has resulted in limited bi- or multi-lateral 
treaties, with limited management or endowment of water resources. At present research dedicated to finding 
rationale for cooperation is restricted to secondary-data analysis based mainly on national and international level 
research-based perspectives on the need for transboundary water management. It is believed that if collaborations 
are to be extended to transboundary agreements, the immediate potential benefits would be flood mitigation, 
disaster risk reduction (DRR), irrigation, and energy security, and long term benefits would include water security and 
conflict resolution. 
If tangible benefits from improved water resource management for social and economic development can be 
demonstrated at local, national and river basin level, it is predicted that coordinated development and reform of 
policies, laws and institutions needed to build the capacity of co-management between stakeholders can indeed be 
advanced at the transboundary level. The principal challenge in water governance is how to develop and manage 
the various transboundary water sources sustainably and efficiently in full agreement and cooperation between the 
appropriate co-basin countries, so that they result in a ‘win-win’ situation for all parties concerned.
1
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Introduction
Finite water resources are delimited by political and national boundaries that restrict resource ownership and use 
to a particular population or a country. Yet, over half of the world’s fresh water flows through and across national 
borders, and 40% of the world’s population lives near these water bodies (Bonvoisin 2013; Marton-Lefèvre 2013). 
The very nature of transboundary waters is such that regulations governing their management may not be restricted 
to national territories, as human dependencies on water in the upstream and downstream regions make its 
governance inherently political and contested. In this context, the distribution, ownership, and use of transboundary 
water resources are highly disputed subjects in academic, professional, and political arenas.
This querulous nature of transboundary water governance is as old as the concept and practice of transboundary 
water management itself. The 1992 Helsinki Convention1 had introduced the first international water law of its kind, 
and ever since adopting the Convention, over 100 countries have either been engaged or have expressed interest 
in transboundary alliances with respect to more than 275 rivers across the world (UNESCO 2013). In theory, the 
water governance discourse is overwhelmed by the realities of attempts made and lessons learnt in transboundary 
water management. Research dedicated to covering different aspects of transboundary water management has 
ranged from studying the nature and history to benefits and institutional requisites of such waters (Kliot et al. 
2001; Biswas 2008a; UNESCO 2013). Now, we believe a systematic inquiry into the rationale behind forming 
transboundary alliances can reinforce and inform further research as well as practice. 
At the core of the rationale lies the question why countries should collaborate with each other to engage in 
transboundary alliances. The corollary question how they should collaborate falls outside the scope of this review 
and is reserved for future research. The paper steers clear of putting emphasis on issues surrounding conflict 
and cooperation, as such rationales alone have not been useful in breaching the lethargies of alliances (Biswas 
2008a; Rasul 2014b). Similarly, the paper consciously leaves out the historically contentious concept of ‘equity’2 in 
transboundary water allocation (Wolf 1999; Lautze et al. 2006), as its comprehensive study would require extensive 
field research, feasible only at a subsequent stage. This paper is restricted to secondary-data analysis based mainly 
on national and international level research-led perspectives on the need for transboundary water management. 
It also acknowledges that investigating regional and ground level perspectives will require a different set of 
enquiry altogether. 
Further, while transboundary alliances have already been part of water governance structures of many countries, 
some transboundary rivers still remain largely unmanaged, as in the Hindu Kush Himalaya (HKH) region. This 
review paper attempts to provide a justification for a pragmatic approach to transboundary water governance 
that goes beyond the usual opposition between the need to avoid conflict and develop cooperation strategies, 
particularly for countries in the HKH where research evidence suggests that such a governance system could have 
momentous socio-economic as well as political implications (Biswas 2008a; Shrestha et al. 2013; Rasul 2014b). 
The plausibility of finding a rationale for forming transboundary alliances in the HKH on which to base further 
research is deemed well worth pursuing such an inquiry. 
1  In 1992, countries of the pan-European region, member states of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), signed 
and adopted the Convention on Protection and Use of Transboundary Waters and International Lakes, thereby forming an international 
water law, as new borders emerged through the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Rivers that previously 
flowed through national borders now crossed new borders due to the change in political boundaries, and competing use of water became 
an international rather than a domestic affair (Bonvoisin 2013).
2  The concept of equity appeared in transboundary-water literature such as the 1966 Helsinki Rules and, later, a paper on the 1997 
United Nations (UN) Convention on the Non-navigational Uses of International Water Courses (IWC), in which transboundary water laws 
are dedicated to the ‘equitable utilisation of the waters of an international basin’ (Lautze et al. 2006, p.93). While many definitions of 
‘fairness’ in water allocation are prevalent at regional and nation-state levels, the term ‘equity’ appears in some water agreements applied 
only at basin level. However, it remains largely unclear how effective the semantics of ‘equity’ are in making transboundary accords 
more equitable.  
2
The main objective of the review is to aid the understanding of the current status and conceivability of 
transboundary water management in HKH countries, to help in policy and decision making. It is essentially a 
narrative review for which specific studies on transboundary water governance were selected, summarised, and 
analysed. Theories found in the reviewed articles were put into perspective to find the fundamental logic behind 
countries opting for transboundary water management. The paper also analyses the development of transboundary 
water governance research and practice over time and presents a current evaluation of the subject in the HKH 
context.  It begins by describing the current status of transboundary governance in the HKH countries, which 
is followed by an analysis of the rationale justifying the importance of the transboundary approach. Existing 
transboundary alliances across the world are then tabulated and their strengths and weaknesses discussed. 
The review then documents various treaties signed within the HKH and ends by exploring possibilities of taking 
discussions on transboundary water governance beyond issues of conflict and cooperation.
3
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The Status of Transboundary Water 
Governance in HKH Countries
It has been duly recognised in water governance3 literature that the water crisis of the 21st century is primarily a 
crisis of governance, which is to say a failure of institutions to manage water resources efficiently for the well-being 
of humans and ecosystems (Biggs et al. 2013; Gupta and Pahl-Wostl 2013). The United Nation’s mandate to 
coordinate water issues is limited, and water laws are rather regional than global in nature, indicating a vaccum 
in water governance at the global level (Gupta, Pahl-Wostl and Zondervan 2013). Regional cooperation in water 
management is said to hold the “recipe for wider cooperation” (Jagerskog 2013, pp. 52). However, the level of 
securitisation in a river basin still acts as an impediment to a functionalist approach to cooperation, as states are 
preoccupied with national security, thereby limiting the room for regional perspectives (Jagerskog 2013). In this 
wider context of transboundary water governance, let us first briefly explore the status of transboundary waters and 
its governance in the HKH before investigating the rationale for transboundary water cooperation in the region 
which takes as a point of departure the current reality of transboundary alliances which has still not evolved despite, 
or perhaps as a result of, disparate political will. 
3  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) defines water governance as the political, social, economic, and administra-
tive systems that influence the use and management of water. Who gets how much, when and how, and who has the right to water and 
related services, and to their benefits, is decided through the engagement of related actors in water governance. It determines the equity 
and efficiency in water resource and services allocation and distribution, and balances water use between socio-economic activities and 
ecosystems. Governing water, therefore, includes the formulation, establishment, and implementation of water policies, legislation, and 
institutions. It also includes clarification of the roles and responsibilities of the government, civil society, and the private sector in relation 
to water resources and services. The outcome depends heavily on how stakeholders act to the rules and roles that have been taken by or 
assigned to them (UNDP undated).  
Similarly, the Global Water Partnership (Rogers and Hall 2003) defines water governance as the range of political, social, economic, and 
administrative systems that are in place to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at different levels of 
society. These two definitions are the most prominent in research and practice of ‘water governance’. It rose as an idea of governing water 
wisely to ensure good governance, at the Second World Water Forum in The Hague in 2000 (Lautze et al. 2011, p. 3).  
The current, widely-accepted definition of water governance comprises the processes and institutions by which decisions that affect water 
are made (ibid., p. 8). 
Treacherous mid-hill topography near the Mahakali River, Nepal
4
It is found that developing countries in particular are far from formulating and implementing water policies, which 
explicitly consider water use for energy and irrigation, as its implications in terms of resource availability and use still 
remain undecided (Biswas 2008a). Against this background, transboundary water management seems like a far-
fetched reality, especially in the HKH where riparian countries in question are still limited to national environmental 
debates and domestic water policies (Blaikie and Muldavin 2004) and transboundary collaborative arrangements 
and institutions4 for water resource management do not yet exist (Tiwari and Joshi 2015). Indeed, it is found 
that water management in that region has been exacted mostly at state rather than at regional level. Centralised 
management systems have yet to accommodate the interests of multiple actors, both at local and supranational 
levels, especially in addressing challenges common to the region’s riparian countries (Shrestha et al. 2013). Even 
within countries, despite the availability of adequate fresh water supplies, there is severe water insecurity due to 
ineffective governance and inequitable access to water (Biggs et al. 2013; Khalid et al. 2014). 
4  Tiwari and Joshi underscore the need for capacity building and the development of partnerships and horizontal and vertical linkages 
among local, regional and national institutions. These practical advances would facilitate improved access to new knowledge, technology 
and critical information and encourage the movement of financial resources to local levels (2014, p.66).
Figure 1:   A map of major transboundary rivers and corresponding basins in the HKH
The Hindu Kush Himalaya region has a complex geography of high mountains, valleys and plateaus. It is home to some 
of the world’s tallest peaks with over 60,000 kilometre square of glaciers and about 760,000 kilometre square of snow 
cover, thus becoming a perennial source of freshwater for agriculture, food production, water supply, sanitation, health, 
energy, tourism, industry and biodiversity systems. The region contains an expanse of ten river basins- the Amu Darya, 
Brahmaputra, Ganges, Indus, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Salween, Tarim, Yangtze and Yellow- which connect upstream and 
downstream areas in terms of culture, communication, trade, commerce and resource management. It also provides goods 
and services directly or indirectly related to water to 1.3 billion people including 210 million that live in the HKH. (Shrestha 
et al. 2013)
5
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In addition, upstream-downstream interdependencies have not yet been backed by strong scientific evidence and 
research in this region, as exploration is on-going. On the one hand, studies have concluded that countries should 
cooperate for socio-economic and political benefits, poverty eradication, aversion of disasters, and sustained 
improvement in living conditions (Biswas 2008a; Bakker 2009; Biswas 2011; Rasul 2014a; Rasul 2014b). On the 
other hand, they still remain rather general, and are yet to conclude whether these countries are both willing and 
able to enter into a transboundary alliance.5 In the light of this finding, it becomes difficult to conclude that their 
current national water policies and management practices either reflect or welcome international water priorities. 
Biswas encapsulates in two of his seminal papers the importance of transboundary waters, specifically in this region, 
highlighting their magnitude, complexities, and potentials. The first presents an overview of the management of 
transboundary waters (2008) and the second analyses the situation of conflict and cooperation in transboundary 
water management in South Asia (2011). The first ‘overview’ paper concludes that the principal challenge in water 
governance is how to develop and manage the various transboundary water sources sustainably and efficiently 
in full agreement and cooperation between the appropriate co-basin countries, so that they result in a ‘win-win’ 
situation for all parties concerned (Biswas 2008a, p. 5). The study also finds that if co-basin countries adopt a 
constructive and positive approach, it will contribute to the creation of virtuous alliances, the absence of which 
could mean that potential benefits would be lost to both people and countries of the concerned region. This 
conclusion has since been echoed and reiterated in later research undertaken on finding a justification for countries 
in the HKH to consider transboundary cooperation (Huitema et al. 2009; Biggs et al. 2013; Rasul 2014b).
In his second ‘conflict’ paper (2011), Biswas goes beyond the relatively generic observations he made in his 
‘overview’ study and presents a more realistic picture of concurrent bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the 
South-Asian region. The study recognises that the political agendas of riparian countries in the region do not 
seem to prioritise transboundary water management, giving preference to bi-lateral or multi-lateral agreements 
and treaties. While it is evident that these countries have political differences, his study claims that focus should be 
shifted from ‘conflict’ and ‘crisis’ to ‘cooperation’, especially in issues related to the range of development sectors 
with which water is infused, such as agriculture, energy, transportation, and industry. 
Biswas illustrates this argument by presenting a case study of four countries in the region that are engaged in such 
agreements, namely India, Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. A comparison is made between the alliance shared 
by Bhutan and India and by Bangladesh, India, and Nepal. He finds that Bhutan and India have experienced a 
‘win-win’ alliance with respect to the use of their transboundary water for hydroelectricity since the mid-1980s, 
contributing substantially to Bhutan’s national income. However, Bangladesh, India, and Nepal, although believed 
to be capable of receiving similar socio-economic benefits, have been unsuccessful in engaging in a transboundary 
alliance due to deep-seated mistrust and attitudinal differences (Biswas 2011; Khalid et al. 2014). One may 
conclude that real progress to use the water of the rivers as a catalyst for infrastructural development and poverty 
alleviation in the region has been minimal due to the absence of transboundary water management systems 
(Biswas 2011). 
Research evidence, according to Biswas, seems to point to three possible scenarios for transboundary cooperation 
in the HKH: pessimistic, optimistic, and plausible. A pessimistic scenario may mean a ‘business-as-usual’ approach, 
with no changes in the way transboundary cooperation is perceived in the region (Biswas 2011; pg. 669). In 
contrast, an optimistic one may be an overly ambitious, unattainable, and unrealistic approach, which may prove to 
be equally deterrent. Biswas posits that a plausible scenario may be one in which countries seek sustainable water 
resource management strategies for the region through cooperation and collaboration. This finding is flanked by 
5  In this paper, transboundary alliances refer to water treaties and alliances that have resulted from compliance with certain international 
conventions or laws, which regulate relationships between states on the use of water resources viewed as a shared common good. This 
means that, from a legal standpoint, a riparian country does not have sole control over a transboundary river under international law.  
The UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Water-Courses provides a common framework for cooperation 
within international river-basins. Various international organisations such as the Institut de Droit International, the International Law Associa-
tion (Helsinki Rules), and the UN Affiliated International Law Commission each prepared a draft of rules for the use of international water 
resources. These drafts were reinforced by the International Court of Justice and other tribunals in their decisions and rulings (Kliot et al. 
2001, p. 232). The words ‘treaties’ and ‘alliances’ have sometimes been used interchangeably in this review to refer to transboundary 
water agreements between two or more nations also. 
6
Rasul’s research on the benefits incurred by the riparian countries in this region (2014b). The principle benefits were 
outlined as follows: 
 flood mitigation;
 augmentation of dry season water availability through economic and timely distribution;
 generation of hydropower and clean energy;
 regional energy security and conflict resolution. 
Rasul’s study picks up from where Biswas leaves his, as the latter’s recommendation of seeking and finding a 
sustainable water resource management strategy is rather unfinished. Both studies, however limited they may 
be, are found to contribute immensely to assessing the feasibility of and providing a theoretical rationale for 
transboundary cooperation in water management in the HKH.
7
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Finding the Rationale for 
Transboundary Water Governance 
There are two broadly framed justifications for countries to engage in transboundary management of water 
resources. The first is the realisation that interdependencies in the upstream and downstream areas in a river-
basin cannot be neglected, as conflicts may arise due to such indifference (Nepal et al. 2014). The second is the 
recognition that countries are bound to enjoy better policies and management practices in water and other sectors 
through collaboration (Kliot 2001; Biswas 2011; Rasul 2014b). International water laws governing transboundary 
waters have evolved out of experiences and past examples of water management, and it is now widely believed 
that basin-wide cooperation is the ideal solution to the problem of managing transboundary river-basins.6 In 
the absence of cross-border and cross-sectorial integration, it is found that riparian countries of a river-basin 
can get into a state of conflict over shared waters (Kliot 2001; Mirumachi and Allan 2007; Zeitoun et al. 2011; 
Akanda 2012). 
While focusing on upstream downstream interdependencies and potential water-related conflict alone cannot create 
an enabling environment for cooperation (Biswas 2011), resolving such conflicts, mainly over water allocation, 
seems to be the first rationale for forming transboundary alliances (Wolf 1999). Secondly, such alliances have 
proven to be helpful not only in better management of shared water resources but also in bringing improvement in 
other sectors, mainly political and developmental, in concerned riparian countries, as particular situations in many 
transboundary alliances all over the world have revealed. This section will explore these two aforementioned core 
rationales that existing transboundary water alliances have brought to the fore and synthesise lessons learnt from 
existing transboundary waters, while endeavouring to find their relevance for the HKH.
6  River-basins have long evolved as an optimum unit for water resource management. Molle (2009) argues that during much of the 20th 
century rivers and aquifers catered to the water necessities of all people. Earlier, water was not thought to be a scarce resource, and ef-
fects on the environment of such extraction were incremental, and went largely unnoticed. The present-day situation of the use and misuse 
of water has meant a depletion of water quality, threatening ecosystems, and an expanding demand for water management.
Linking road that connects Nepal with Tibet 
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At this point, we need to divert our attention momentarily to ask why the river-basin concept is indispensable for 
transboundary waters. Transboundary water governance has respected the tenets of hydrology7, opting for a more 
unified approach to water resource management. At the same time, river-basin governance, in reality, is now 
assuredly moving towards division and decentralisation, with increased recognition of politically sovereign units 
within a basin. Considering these opposing trends, the question arises whether there is a theoretical space in which 
a rationale for transboundary collaboration may be developed through an understanding of the river-basin scale. 
Historically, the domestication of water marked a pivotal moment in the cultural trajectories of many regions in the 
world where states and societies developed. This enabled the consolidation and framing of farming practices and 
necessitated water management systems, which have now evolved across 275 transboundary waters mostly at the 
river-basin scale (Mithen 2010; UNESCO 2013). While a meticulous chronicling of the rise and fall of river-basin 
management ideologies throughout history falls outside the scope of this review, it is necessary to mark the distinct 
phases in which the river-basin concept has picked up pace until now. This is done to recognise the river-basin as 
an evolving unit of transboundary water resource management and not a singular conceptual occurrence. 
We stretch no further back in time than the 1930s, when the concept of regionalism put forth the idea that the 
‘region’ should become the unit for action, and planning would be used to achieve development as a solution to 
the Great Depression.8 The rhetoric of scientific, rational, and political planning slowly gave way to river-basin 
planning, mainly to provide justification for navigation, irrigation, and power projects, paralleled by the concept 
of river-basin accounting, which expanded cost-benefit analysis to multipurpose projects of the water resources 
department in the United States of America (Molle 2009). 
A parallel evolution took place in Europe with central issues of drainage, pollution, and hydropower, eliciting 
institutional changes and readjusting planning to include the river-basin as a management unit. It helped to realign 
power structures to include local, national and regional levels. In the 1950s, the UN General Secretary stated that 
river-basin development was recognised as an essential feature of economic development. However, the river-
basin concept was picked up only in the 1990s as a unit for development. By then, pollution and water quality 
issues became the subject of prominent debates in all industrialised countries and bolstered the need for a river-
basin scale of management, since the complexities of local problems at basin level and administrative conflicts 
had taken centre stage (Molle et al. 2007; Molle 2009). This paved the way for a unified, comprehensive, and 
integrated approach to water resource management, reflected in the river-basin model. With the rise of the concept 
of integrated water resource management (IWRM), focus was directed to river-basins as the efficient planning and 
management unit to implement IWRM principles from the 1990s onward. 
Now, at the institutional level, the IWRM concept has been formalised through the establishment of River-basin 
Organisations (RBOs) in countries like Brazil, Indonesia, Morocco, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, which were particularly 
influenced by the French and the Australian RBO models9 promoted by the Global Water Partnership (GWP) and 
the International Network for Basin Organisations (INBO). Although deemed to be ‘old-wine-in-a-new-bottle’ 
approach (Biswas 2008b; pg. 16), IWRM and its Integrated River-basin Management (IRBM) derivative have now 
become influential in mainstream thinking on water management (ADB 2000; GTZ 2001; WWF 2001; OECD 
2003; Molle 2009).
The river-basin scale has become central to a globally hegemonic discourse of river water governance, but it is 
also a contested scale in which multiple interests at local, national and regional levels are now deployed, and 
therein lies a paradox. Widely accepted by donors, governments, and NGOs alike as a way to democratise water 
7  The mutable nature of water, understood through the hydrological cycle and acknowledged in hydrology, does not respect the human 
concept of geo-political boundaries, thus defining transboundary waters or waters that cross border concepts.
8  As part of the New Deal, Roosevelt established the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1933. It became a major experiment in large-
scale planning, tying industry, agriculture, forestry, and flood prevention into a unified whole. The TVA became the most seminal of 
regional development projects and propounded the high-modernism ideology that scientific knowledge and systematic rational planning 
could radically change society (Molle 2009, p. 487).
9  Institutional arrangements such as the Murray-Darling River Commission in Australia and the French Water Agencies are some RBO 
forms. As councils, they provide a platform for negotiation, conflict-solving, and minimal regulation of allocation of water resources. This 
approach has also been adopted in Mexico, South Africa, and Zimbabwe (Molle 2009).
9
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management, rationalise water resource use, and manage conflict between water users in river-basins (Warner 
et al. 2014), river-basin management is thought to have normalised and, therefore, undermined some of the 
conditions underlying these water management trends. Warner et al. claim that systemic approaches like the river-
basin invites ‘centralising, synoptic management models, blueprints, and end products [deemed to be] cathedrals of 
progress’ (Warner et al. 2014, p. 478). This is exemplified when river-basin management is often manipulated for 
political ends, as this management scale allows states to continue to guard their sovereignty and use infrastructure 
to reinforce sovereign interests. 
Further, while river-basin councils and platforms do challenge conventional, centralised decision-making and 
expertise, which fail to cater to the complexities of water-related problems, basin-level participation is increasingly 
being questioned. That is to say, river-basin may not be the ideal scale to promote participation across the 
board, as levels of involvement in reality are interweaved and composed of political networks that are difficult to 
disentangle (Molle 2007; Hoogesteger 2012). Still, the river-basin has been a constantly evolving management 
unit, which has a pronounced relevance in today’s context as a geographical unit for water resources development 
and management. But what consequence does the river-basin scale of management have for transboundary water 
governance, and is it relevant for the HKH?
Touted to be the future of water management in adaptive governance literature, the river-basin approach adopts 
the bioregional perspective and the bioregion scale as a co-management strategy across country borders (Huitema 
et al 2008). It advocates the need to create institutional collaboration either by transferring existing responsibilities 
to the basin level and creating a unitary river basin organisation or by combining existing political jurisdictions 
to create collaborative decision making structures supported by legislature (Schlager and Blomquist 2000), even 
though the feasibility and desirability of RBOs is questioned (Biswas 2004). Critical, however, to the success of such 
transboundary collaboration is the level of authority national government grant to RBOs to manage the respective 
basins, as the most successful existing RBOs are highly supported by basin governments and legislation (WRI 
2006). As such, HKH countries would have to re-evaluate their own stance in conceding authority over their waters 
to a river-basin authority, the occurrence of which is rather contestable but worth exploring. Further, river-basins 
also remain the optimum unit of management thanks to their upstream-downstream interconnectedness (Molle 
2009) essential to the ecological and political context of the HKH (Shrestha et al. 2013). Consequently, exploring 
upstream and downstream interests may help in and bolster the argument for finding, at once, a unified and a 
decentralised approach to water governance in transboundary river-basins.
Upstream-downstream interdependencies
Transboundary water governance may be vital in regions with interdependencies in upstream and downstream 
regions. Such interdependencies within a river-basin mean that differential management needs arise in different 
parts of a river-basin, as land and river systems are strongly affected by human actions across spatial scales (Allan 
2004). This necessitates countries to co-manage water resources even more when river-basins cross borders10 
(Pigram 2000; Moellenkamp 2007). Therefore, integrated land and water resources planning and management 
on river-basin scale become necessary to give due regard to the linkages between upstream and downstream 
catchment areas. This is particularly relevant in river-basins in the HKH with large differences in elevation, 
where climatic and geological conditions differ at the source of the river or the headwater systems11 from those 
downstream (Nepal et al. 2014). 
Further, events in the upstream area can directly affect situations downstream and when these two areas fall in two 
different countries, one side may not endorse river-basin regulations upheld by the other which hinders governance 
10  International rivers, either successive, crossing borders, or contiguous, forming borders, challenge political boundaries of nations. 
Further, these rivers have three absolute positions that are relevant to management: upstream, midstream, and downstream. The underlying 
hydrological structure of an international river requires management that accepts perceived influences of the interdependence of upstream 
and downstream interests, making it critical to consider transboundary collaboration to take into account such interdependencies.
11  Headwater systems are areas from which water originates within a channel network and are characterized by interactions among 
hydrologic, geomorphic, and biological processes that vary from hills slopes to stream channels. They are important sources of sediments, 
water, nutrients, and organic matter for downstream reaches (Gomi et al. 2012). 
10
of transboundary waters. Transboundary basin linkages become even more challenging in the Himalayan region, 
for it consists of sparsely populated upstream regions with remote accessibility and has a fragile geology. It is also 
the source of major rivers that flow into basin areas, which are home to approximately one-fifth of the world’s 
population (Gomi et al. 2002; Shrestha et al. 2013). Research suggests that resource management in the upstream 
region has both positive and negative effects on communities living in the downstream region, either providing 
better opportunities for or limiting these and, in addition, degrading environmental and water conditions for 
downstream areas12. This in turn makes it imperative for downstream areas to have a legitimate interest in land and 
water resource management decisions made in the upstream areas (Gomi et al. 2002). 
Benefits of water in international river-basins are largely undermined by a lack of consideration of interdependence 
in water resource planning. However, research also shows that in many cases an overestimation of such 
interdependencies has also been contributing to a lack of cooperation, especially in the HKH (Wu et al. 2013). In 
the Ganges basin, for example, there is a widely held belief that dams in Nepal produce large downstream benefits 
for India, which creates expectations of proportionate recompense. However, it was found that constructing large 
dams on the upstream tributaries of the Ganges may in fact have more limited effects on controlling downstream 
floods than was thought, and that the benefits of low-flow augmentation13 delivered by storage infrastructures are 
currently low (ibid., p.104). Similarly, it was thought initially that the level of interdependence between Bangladesh, 
Nepal, and India was high regarding uses of water for hydropower and other purposes. Consequently, initiatives 
taken by Nepal and India were not welcomed by Bangladesh because of the potential effect on the availability of 
water during the dry season in Farakka. However, studies showed that the trade-off between hydropower production 
and downstream water uses was next to negligible, since not even a significant use of water for hydropower affected 
irrigation in India or low-flow augmentation in Bangladesh. 
12  Due to forest and watershed degradation in the Churia hills, siltation poses a serious threat in the Terai region of Nepal. In an assess-
ment of upstream Churia hills and downstream Terai linkages, Singh (undated) claims that heavy exploitation in the Churia hills for the 
extraction of timber, firewood, non-timber forest products, grazing resources, gravel, sand, and boulders was carried out by local com-
munities and the local government to gather revenue. In doing so they were converting fertile and productive arable lands into barren river 
beds at a fast rate. For example, the Jalad River in Dhanusha district originating from the Churia hills causes siltation and turns 25 hectares 
of arable lands into barren riverbeds every year. Singh posits that these hills should instead be conserved for environmental services of the 
watershed to the entire Terai region rather than for provisioning tangible forest products services only to upstream communities.  
13  Low flow augmentation is the provision of water through the development of new water storage facilities or the purchase of storage 
space in existing water storage facilities, or both, equal to the amount of consumptive use. 
Kailash landscape in Khasha (Nepal); the Kailash Range, which forms part of the Transhimalaya in Tibet, is a water source for 
the Indus, Sutlej, Brahmaputra and Karnali River in the HKH
11
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These outcomes advise against an overestimation of the effects of riparian interdependencies, which could create 
obstacles for cooperation in transboundary river-basins, for it may rationalise anxieties and fears of downstream 
countries regarding the effects of large upstream infrastructures (Wu et al. 2013). Further, studies also claim that 
a better understanding of the actual interdependence between respective countries could not only be more cost 
beneficial in terms of infrastructural development but also allow the riparian countries to be more open to mutual 
benefit-sharing, as some of the apprehensions that arise from unrealistic perceptions of dependence and ensuing 
tension may be moderated (Biswas 2011; Nepal et al. 2014; Rasul 2014b). While research on such analysis is 
on-going, we take due account of current research which recognises the existence of upstream and downstream 
interdependencies and need for a transboundary approach to cater to resulting water governance needs. 
Benefits in water and other sectors 
Many research studies have focused on calculating and analysing the benefits of adopting a transboundary 
water management structure. That is to say, a structure in which different national government bodies will have 
to collaborate in order to manage issues that cross jurisdictional boundaries and fall into different policy sectors 
(Huitema et al. 2009, p. 26). Existing transboundary alliances across the globe have mainly negotiated water usage 
for navigation, irrigation, hydro-energy, fishing, pollution and flood control, and drinking water distribution (Conti 
2013; Jagerskog 2013). In the HKH, transboundary alliances are still limited to bi- or multi-lateral treaties, with 
limited management or endowment of water resources. 
If collaboration were to be extended to more vigorous transboundary agreements, the immediate potential benefits 
would be identified as flood mitigation, disaster risk reduction (DRR), irrigation, and energy security, while long-
term benefits would include water security and conflict resolution (Biswas 2011; Shrestha et al. 2013; Rasul 
2014b). While it has been enthusiastically argued in many studies that sowing the seeds of efficient transboundary 
water management at the regional level can enable countries to reap the aforementioned benefits in water as 
well as other sectors (Biswas 2011; UNESCO 2013; Rasul 2014), some studies claim that one may be stretching 
the boundaries of the achievements made through the water sector slightly too far by making such claims 
(Jagerskog 2013). 
Women collect tall grass growing on the riverbed of the Ganges River near a barrage in Bettiah (India)
12
West Bengal's Department of Tourism installed a road-side hoarding board displaying a tourism park construction plan, in 
Gajoldoba in downstream Teesta River; Teesta is a successive international river that crosses borders
In view of this contradictory finding, it may be better, then, to consider how policy and practice across and beyond 
the water sector have been affected by transboundary water alliances. To this effect, we first examine some of 
the most prominent existing international transboundary water treaties and analyse the nature of the postulated 
mandates of these alliances. Then, we assess water treaties retained within the region of South Asia, examining their 
status, structure, and functionalities. See Tables 1 and 2, which tabulate key features of several transboundary river-
basins across the globe, including those in the HKH. 
The objectives of this exercise are twofold:
 to evaluate the nature of existing transboundary alliances, their successes and failures; and 
 to assess the benefits incurred through alliances in different sectors. 
This exercise is thought to help to determine why such alliances are useful, and what would happen in their 
absence. At this point, we note that scientific evidence is lacking with respect to the exact nature of overall economic 
as well as specific sector benefits incurred by each riparian country. Research is also still wanting on the willingness 
of each HKH country to agree to a binding agreement with concerned riparian countries. For this would oblige 
them not only to a bi-literal or multi-lateral treaty but also to an international convention on transboundary river 
waters, which would potentially limit sovereign rights of a country to govern its water resources.
13





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Transboundary alliances were typically formed out of the necessity to resolve conflicts arising out of water scarcity, 
rapid population growth, mal-distribution and over-utilisation of water resources. It is found that institutions involved 
in safeguarding the protraction and sustenance of these alliances gradually moved from norms of customary law to 
mandatory international laws governing transboundary waters. Subsequently, the latter required riparian countries to 
limit the sovereignty of their state over water resources when entering a transboundary alliance, since it would mean 
joint management of and sharing of control over water sources. It is found that these norms evolved from a lengthy 
process in which disputes on the utilisation of shared water resources were frequently observed and sometimes 
resolved (in the case of the Danube and Elbe River-basins, see Table 1). 
Transboundary water institutions have long proven to be effective forums for conflict resolution14, with spill-over 
effects in the political arena. For it may be argued that in many parts around the world water scarcity coupled with 
haphazard population growth, mal-distribution, and over-utilisation of water resources may have pushed certain 
areas around the world into ‘arenas of conflict’ (Kliot 2001, p. 252). Still, it is postulated that water wars may 
never be waged over disputes on transboundary water sharing alone, for countries may choose instead to move to 
conflict resolution through better management and utilisation of shared waters (as exemplified in the Nile Basin, see 
Table 1). 
Some transboundary alliances, such as those for the Indus, Jordan, and Ganges, have also evolved after long 
periods of mostly unresolved and evolving conflicts with one or more riparian country or countries (Tiwary 2000). 
For this reason, these alliances include only a few riparian member states, since forming alliances meant excluding 
some contending parties. However, the hydrological nature of a river-basin is such that any activity in one part of a 
river-basin results in outcomes, positive or negative, in other parts of the basin. Kliot (2001) found that treating the 
river-basin as one unit prevented harm from being caused to some riparian countries and helped distribute benefits 
14  Attention should be drawn here to the fact that conflict is not an insulated concept or occurrence but rather a term for situations that are 
produced by and inextricably linked to environments that enable them to perpetuate. Such environments may be characterised by over-
population and over-use of resources, or in some cases, lack of use of resources, producing conditions that lead to conflict over allocation, 
use, and preservation of water resources. 
Road linking India and Nepal over the Gandak Barrage on the Nepal-India border
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more equally among them. Indeed, it was found that excluding riparian countries falling within one river-basin unit 
resulted in transboundary alliances with limited scope and future, leading to potential conflict when non-member 
riparian countries would demand their share. This is exemplified by the Nile, Mekong, Indus, and Ganges situations 
(see Tables 1 and 2). 
The inclusion and participation of all riparian countries becomes dire in order to ensure that all riparian countries 
have the opportunity to tap into whatever benefit the river-basin may provide as a whole. Transboundary water 
alliances may not just be a necessity for some countries linked inextricably by their riparian interdependencies. They 
could also become an opportunity to manage water resources, especially to enjoy benefits incurred by such an 
alliance in non-water sectors. Water has increasingly been linked to energy, agriculture, and food security (Rasul 
2014a) in the HKH. Indeed, hydropower and irrigation are the two most significant uses of water that have long 
been regulated through international treaties, and this trend of water use seems to be echoed in riparian HKH 
countries (see Table 2).
The most positive examples of use of transboundary water agreement in the HKH may be the alliance shared by 
Bhutan and India, claimed to be mutually beneficial to both countries. Water-based development projects such as 
the Chukka and the Kuri Chu (see Table 2) are said to have led not only to regional peace and stability but also to 
national economic gain. As a smaller riparian member nation, Bhutan’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
increased from the lowest in South Asia to the highest in the Ganga-Brahmaputra-Meghna (GBM) region (Biswas 
2011). Similarly, studies have claimed that the economic, environmental, social, and political benefits incurred 
through multi-purpose river projects could be enormously beneficial and realistically achievable, if at varying 
degrees. By drawing from transboundary examples around the world, it is found that such projects have helped 
store monsoon water, mitigate droughts and other water-related disasters, augment dry-season river flows, expand 
irrigation and navigation facilities, and generate hydropower that riparian HKH countries could also use (Biggs 
2013; Shrestha et al. 2013; Rasul 2014a; Rasul 2014b).
Further, some existing transboundary alliances have instigated water-related development projects, generating 
hydropower, irrigating agricultural lands, mitigating natural disasters, and improving navigation, benefiting the 
entire river-basin (as exemplified in the Senegal Basin, see Table 1). If tangible benefits from improved water 
resource management for social and economic development can be demonstrated at local, national and river-
basin level, it is predicted that coordinated development and reform of policies, laws and institutions needed to 
build the capacity of co-management between stakeholders can indeed be advanced at the transboundary level 
(Marton-Lefevre 2013). Therefore, provided that the involvement of each riparian in a transboundary alliance is not 
overshadowed or hampered by another, it may be safe to conclude that such alliances could have more on offer 
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Scenarios Beyond Conflict and 
Cooperation for HKH
To restrict the actualities of transboundary water governance within the realms of conflict and cooperation is 
to incapacitate it. Transboundary relations are determined, above all, by political processes which operate in 
equivocal ways, and to argue the opposite would require delving into the abyss of the imaginary. Thinking about 
transboundary water relations in terms of either undesirable conflict or desirable cooperation simply overlooks the 
fact that transboundary waters involve countries with a differing approach towards transboundary collaboration, 
driven by considerations that no doubt include but also go beyond the water sector. Instead of directly addressing 
water sharing issues, development-oriented sectorial cooperation in areas such as hydropower generation is found 
to eventually widen the canvas of collaboration in the HKH. 
Transboundary waters are also found to produce differing intensities of conflict and cooperation in transboundary 
relations between riparian countries, marked by different periods of interaction and non-interaction (Mirumachi and 
Allan 2007; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008; Zeitoun et al. 2011). Such a politically-framed perspective will allow for 
a broad way of thinking about transboundary water relations by systematically including power relations between 
riparian countries. This will help us to consider the political conditions along with the usual economic considerations 
enabling a successful transboundary alliance. Thus, it may be better to start with an understanding that countries 
may not only have different attitudes to and needs for water management regimes, but also be positioned to benefit 
differently from transboundary alliances. When realised, these needs may push alliances towards higher degrees of 
success.  
Global experience dictates that transboundary water bodies are different from each other in terms of size, water 
availability, and use requirements (Biswas 2008a; UNESCO 2013). They are also different in terms of physical and 
environmental conditions (and changes within these conditions), institutional capacities, management structure 
requisites and capacities, historical relationships, power structures, economic conditions, and social aspirations of 
the people and the co-basin countries involved. This shows how transboundary water dynamics may necessitate 
adaptive resource management15 for more robust governance (Mirumachi and Allan 2007). It also shows how each 
transboundary alliance could be unique and rather difficult to replicate (Wolf 1999; Zeitoun and Mirumachi 2008; 
Zeitoun et al. 2011). Nowhere is this recognition more pertinent than in the HKH. 
It is also necessary to point out the fact that transboundary water advocacy on a global scale has long moved 
beyond finding a rationale behind such water governance systems into implementation, as many transboundary 
alliances are already in place and effective. However, in the HKH, there are long-standing but defunct bilateral 
treaties regarding the use of water for hydropower and irrigation. The limited understanding of the transboundary 
rationale in this region needs to be expanded not only to take into account immediate sector benefits but also long 
term inter-sectorial and developmental benefits. Moreover, it requires the realisation that incurring potential benefits 
may not be sufficient enough criteria for collaboration, as the current disjointed situation reveals. 
15  Adaptive governance assumes that governance structures cannot accommodate uncertainties that may arise at different levels of govern-
ment. It is ‘an approach that treats on-the-ground actions and policies as hypotheses from which learning derives, which, in turn, provides 
the basis for changes in subsequent actions and policies’ (Stankey et al. 2005, p.1). At a time of increasing climate uncertainty, natural 
resource management may benefit from confronting uncertainties by adopting adaptive resource management as a governance response 
(Nichols et al. 2011). Adaptive resource management incorporates polycentric governance setups, public participation, an experimental 
approach to resource management, and management at a bio-regional scale. These are governance aspects thought to best address rapid 
changes. Moreover, problems such as transboundary pollution, tropical deforestation, and climate uncertainties are large-scale effects, 
which may necessitate a mix of institutions and designs facilitating experimentation, learning, and change (Dietz et al. 2003; Huitema et 
al. 2009; De Stefano et al. 2012). 
22
Thinking along this line, learning from good and bad practices in international transboundary alliances by 
conducting an extended research not only to determine factors aiding or hindering collaboration but also to see 
what may work for each riparian country involved in the HKH may be the way forward. Current research can only 
help us to understand the broad notions of potential benefits, both economic and political. It may, therefore, be 
easy to get swayed by unhinged optimism without knowing how each country in the region could be positioned to 
benefit from transboundary alliances differently (Biswas 2011). For no matter how high the promise of benefit, if the 
issues of equitable distribution, political asymmetry, and sharing of benefits are not resolved, transboundary water 
governance in this region may well be limited to the boundaries of existing research. 
We recognise there are many areas of transboundary governance that have not been addressed in this paper. 
Keeping to the view that each transboundary position and experience of riparian countries is unique, we strive 
to steer clear of comparisons of international river-basins with those in the HKH with similar problems of water 
governance, at the cost of potentially weakening the transboundary rationale in the region. This is done in 
recognition of a most critical fact that, although transboundary water management is considered desirable at many 
levels, water is still seen as a sovereign wealth rather than a shared common in the HKH, where nation states have 
preferred guarding their sovereign riparian rights to incurring increased mutual benefits. The reasons for this may 
be too overwhelming to contextualise and historicise within the precincts of this paper; they would necessitate a 
historically-situated research on its own. 
Further research could engage in scenario building and explore two options: either continue with and strengthen 
existing bi-lateral treaties or engage in a multi-lateral or transboundary alliance involving all concerned river-
basin countries. If the second, research could inspect a hypothetical situation in which each HKH country decides 
to sign and ratify the UN Water Convention, studying the many rights and responsibilities of HKH countries 
under the international law and principles of the Convention. However, should the possibility of revising and 
bolstering of existing bi-lateral treaties be reserved, another research gap could be filled by determining the cost 
of ‘inaction’ for all riparian HKH countries in the event of business-as-usual scenario where countries continue 
to protect their sovereign rights over water resources. These currently vacant areas of research would help, first, 
Teesta III dam wall construction at Chunthang, Sikkim (India)
23
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to conceive of countries’ positions within a more vigorous transboundary alliance. It would also help to answer 
another fundamental question of what may be the different enabling conditions and institutional mechanisms to 
facilitate regional cooperation over shared river waters. Additionally, the role, capacity and limitations of regional 
institutions like the South-Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and ICIMOD in improving access to 
knowledge, technology, critical information and financial resources could be researched to find out whether such 
existing institutional platforms could indeed provide appropriate forums to develop a shared understanding of water 
governance in the region. 
24
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